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THE IMPOSITION OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS AFTER
A VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp.,
823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987).
In Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp. I the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a federal district court maintains jurisdiction
to impose sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure' after a plaintiff files a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to
Rule 41(a)(1)(i).3
Szabo Food Service, Inc. ("Szabo") and Canteen Corporation ("Can-
teen") submitted competing bids to supply food to the Cook County
Jail.4 The Cook County Board awarded the contract to Canteen.' Szabo
filed a complaint6 in federal district court against Canteen and the
County Board,7 and requested a temporary restraining order to prevent
Canteen from acting on the contract. The district court refused to grant
the temporary restraining order, but ordered Canteen to fie, within sev-
enty-two hours, papers in opposition to Szabo's request for a preliminary
injunction.' Before the seventy-two hours expired, Szabo served a notice
of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i). 9 Canteen later filed a
motion for sanctions requesting attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 11.10
The district court denied the motion and Canteen appealed. On appeal,
Szabo argued that the voluntary dismissal deprived the district court of
1. 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 41. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
4. 823 F.2d at 1075. Szabo previously held the contract between 1978 and November 1986.
The county board requested bids for the term beginning in November 1986.
5. Id. Canteen's bid was lower by more than $1 million but an evaluation committee had
rated Szabo's bid superior due to other specifications.
6. The complaint alleged a state law claim violation of due process, and racial discrimination.
Id.
7. Id. The complaint also named as defendants the individual board members, Cook County,
and the Cook County purchasing agent.
8. Id. at 1073-1076. Canteen claimed that their attorneys worked round-the-clock for those
72 hours in order to prepare their opposition to Szabo's motion for preliminary injunction.
9. Id. at 1076. Canteen's opposition papers were due at 4:30 p.m. on October 17. At 1:15
p.m. that same day, Szabo filed the notice of voluntary dismissal.
10. Id. Canteen also sought fees as a prevailing party pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Szabo had
filed suit against Canteen in state court and during the course of discovery in that suit, Canteen
became convinced that Szabo filed the federal suit without meeting the requirements of Rule 11. See
infra note 12 for text of Rule 11. Canteen sought more than $10,000 in attorney's fees. Id. at 1084.
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jurisdiction to award attorney's fees against it. The Seventh Circuit va-
cated the district court's denial of sanctions11 and held: a Rule
41(a)(1)(i) voluntary dismissal does not terminate a district court's juris-
diction to impose Rule 11 sanctions.
Rule 11 requires an attorney to make a reasonable inquiry into the
legal and factual basis of any motion or pleading before filing them in
court. 2 The rule mandates that a district court impose sanctions on the
attorney, the client, or both13 upon finding that the filing is not grounded
in fact, not warranted by existing law or is interposed for the purpose
of delay.14 The sanction may consist of an order to pay the other party's
reasonable attorney's fees.15  Since a 1983 amendment to the
. 11. On the merits, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of § 1988 attorney's
fees and remanded for further district court action on the Rule 11 sanctions. Id. at 1084-85.
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. The rule provides:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be
stated... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation ....
13. The rule states:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a repre-
sented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing
of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. (emphasis added).
The imposition of sanctions is mandatory upon a finding of a violation and is not left to the
discretion of the district court. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254
(2d Cir. 1985) ("By employing the imperative 'shall', we believe the drafters intended to stress the
mandatory nature of the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the rule. Unlike statutory provisions
that vest the district court with 'discretion' to award fees, Rule 11 is clearly phrased as a directive.").
But see Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 200
(1985) (courts will not consider themselves bound by the mandatory language of the rule).
14. A violation exists where after a reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could not form a
reasonable belief that the pleading is grounded in fact or law. Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254. The Advi-
sory Committee Notes to the Rule's 1983 amendment state, "The standard is one of reasonableness
under the circumstances." 97 F.R.D. 196, 198. The Advisory Committee Notes also list four fac-
tors that affect the reasonableness of the inquiry: (1) the length of time available for the signer; (2)
whether the signer had to rely on client information as to the underlying facts; (3) whether the filing
was based on a plausible view of the law; and (4) whether the signer depended on forwarding counsel
or another member of the bar. 97 F.R.D. at 199. For a discussion of the reasonable inquiry stan-
dard see Note, Plausible Pleadings" Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. RrV.
630, 642-43 (1987).
15. See text of Rule 11, supra note 13. Although the imposition of sanctions may be
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rule, 16 courts increasingly 17 have invoked Rule 11 to curb frivolous or
vexatious litigation and to prevent filings for the purpose of delay.',
Courts have had little opportunity, however, to address Rule 11 sanc-
tions in the context of a Rule 41(a)(1)(i) voluntary dismissal. A Rule
41(a)(1)(i) voluntary dismissal allows a plaintiff to extricate himself from
a suit any time prior to filing of the defendant's answer or motion for
summary judgment.19 The plaintiff's notice of dismissal terminates the
suit without further court intervention.20 In addition, courts generally
mandatory, the type and amount of sanction are within the discretion of the district court. See Levin
& Sobel, Achieving Balance in the Developing Law of Sanctions, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 587, 600
(1987) (Courts award various types of sanctions including fines paid into the court for use of the
court's time, publication of the offending attorney's name, as well as attorney's fees to the other
party.).
16. Prior to 1983, Rule 11 imposed a subjective standard on an attorney. The 1983 amendment
changed that standard to an objective one. For a discussion of the change in standards, see Eastway,
762 F.2d at 253.
17. Compare Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 34-36 (1976) (a study revealed that
between 1938 and 1976 parties invoked Rule I 1 in only 23 reported cases, and courts found viola-
tions of the rule in only 9 cases) with Levin & Sobel, supra note 15 at 592 (a LEXIS search on March
5, 1987 uncovered approximately 700 district court cases that contain discussions of Rule 11
sanctions).
18. Rule 11 protects not only the opposing parties in the litigation but also protects the court
from frivolous or vexatious litigation. Commentators have emphasized various purposes of Rule 11.
See A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
38, 40, (Federal Judicial Center 1984) (emphasizing the cost shifting aspects of the sanctions---costs
being shifted to give relief to innocent parties at the expense of those guilty of improper conduct);
Levin & Sobel, supra note 15, at 593 (emphasizing the deterrent effect of amended Rule 11).
19. Rule 41(a)(1) provides: "[A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of the
court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or
of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs... ." FED. R. Civ. P. 41.
This dismissal is without prejudice. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(2).
Only the occurrence of one of these two events terminates the plaintiff's right to a Rule 41(a)(l)(i)
dismissal. Thorp v. Scarne, 599 F.2d 1169, 1174 (2d Cir. 1979). If the defendant serves an answer
or moves for summary judgment, the plaintiff may only dismiss upon order of the court, and with
whatever terms and conditions the court deems proper. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
20. See Universidad Central Del Caribe, Inc. v. Liason Committee on Medical Education, 760
F.2d 14, 19 (Ist Cir. 1985). (41(a)(1)(i) is a self-executing dismissal and the court has no power to
attach conditions to it); Thorp v. Scarne, 599 F.2d 1169, 1171 (2d Cir. 1979) (a Rule 41(a)(1)(i)
dismissal requires no action or approval by the court); Carter v. U.S., 547 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1977)
(plaintiff has an absolute right to dismiss under Rule 41(a)(1)(i)). But see Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v.
American Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1953) (prohibiting dismissal as of right pursuant to
Rule 41(a)(l)(i) because, although the defendant had not answered or moved for summary judg-
ment, the court had addressed the merits of the claim), cert denied, 345 U.S. 964. Harvey Alumi-
num is definitely the minority view. See Foss v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Paul, 808
F.2d 657, 659-660 (8th Cir. 1986).
Washington University Open Scholarship
416 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
hold that a Rule 41(a)(1)(i) dismissal precludes a court from awarding
attorney's fees provided for under specific federal statutes.
In Corcoran v. Columbia Broadcast System, Inc.,21 however, the Ninth
Circuit awarded attorney's fees to the defendant pursuant to the Copy-
right Act of 190922 after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the complaint.
The Copyright Act authorized the court to award reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing party in a suit brought under the Act. The court in
Corcoran viewed the defendant as the "prevailing party" regardless of the
dismissal.23 However, a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i)
is without prejudice.24 Thus, the defendant cannot logically be consid-
ered a "prevailing party."
In Williams v. Ezell,25 the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's
award of attorney's fees where the plaintiff sought voluntary dismissal
under Rule 41(a)(1)(i). The court emphasized the plaintiff's absolute
Rule 41(a)(1)(i) right to dismiss before a responsive pleading.26 The
court stated that not only did the district court lack power to deny the
plaintiff's right to dismiss but that the district court also lacked the
power or discretion to attach any condition or burden to that right.27
In Santiago v. Victim Services Agency,28 the Second Circuit held that a
district court "did not have jurisdiction" to award attorney's fees pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 198829 after the plaintiff filed a Rule 41(a)(1)(i) notice
of voluntary dismissal.30 The court further stated that the district court
lacked power to reserve jurisdiction on the question of attorney's fees
21. 121 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1941).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1982).
23. The court stated that because the defendant had been put to the expense of making an
appearance, "the party sued is the prevailing party within the spirit and intent of the [Copyright
Act]." Corcoran, 121 F.2d at 576.
24. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
25. 531 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1976).
26. Id. at 1263. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The court held that the plaintiffhad
a right to voluntarily dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i) even though the plaintiff's action had been
previously dismissed with prejudice and subsequently been partially reinstated at plaintiff's motion
and even though a hearing had been held on a motion for injunctive relief. 531 F.2d at 1263.
27. Id. at 1264. The court stated that the district court's order granting attorney's fees was a
nullity.
28. 753 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1985).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 authorizes the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a civil
rights action upon a finding of a frivolous or meritless claim. Id. at 22.
30. 753 F.2d at 220. The court stated that once a plaintiff dismisses the action the district court
loses all jurisdiction over the action. See generally In re International Business Machines Corp., 687
F.2d 591, 600-02 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussion of Rule 41(a)(1) in the context of consent decrees).
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after a 41(a)(1)(i) voluntary dismissal. In Santiago, the court noted that
allowing a district court to reserve jurisdiction would discourage volun-
tary dismissals.31
Recently, courts have addressed the Williams and Santiago holdings in
the context of Rule 11 sanctions. In Perez v. Velez,32 the district court
found that Rule 11 attorney's fees were appropriate even though the
plaintiff filed notice of voluntary dismissal. The Perez court distin-
guished Santiago because in Perez the district court had dismissed the
complaint due to lack of merit before the plaintiff filed the notice of vol-
untary dismissal. The court stated that the plaintiff, relying on Santiago,
filed the notice of voluntary dismissal in an apparent attempt to avoid the
sanction. a
In Foss v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Paul,34 the Eighth
Circuit held that Rule 11 sanctions were invalid .after the plaintiff's Rule
41(a)(1)(i) voluntary dismissal. In Foss, the district court refused to rec-
ognize the plaintiff's notice of dismissal and proceeded to the merits of
the case. The district court then dismissed the action with prejudice and
imposed Rule 11 sanctions. In reversing, the Eighth Circuit relied on the
mandatory, self-executing nature of a Rule 41(a)(1)(i) dismissal.35
31. Santiago, 753 F.2d at 223. The court also emphasized that a defendant in a frivolous suit
can preserve his claim for attorney's fees simply by filing an answer or motion for summary judg-
ment. Id.
32. 629 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See also Interstate Underwriting Agencies, Inc. v.
Gunter, 624 F. Supp. 774, 775 (S.D. Fla. 1985). (The Perez court relied on Williams for a finding
that Rule 11 sanctions were inappropriate. The court stated, "Had the defendants moved for attor-
ney's fees under the sanction provision of Rule 11 ... this court would be without jurisdiction to
enter any orders, in light of plaintiff's voluntary dismissal.").
33. 629 F. Supp. at 737.
34. 808 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986).
35. Id. at 659, 660. The Eighth Circuit in Kurkowski v. Volker, 819 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1987),
allowed an award of Rule 11 sanctions after the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal. The Kurkowski court
distinguished Foss because in Kurkowski the defendant moved to dismiss before the plaintiff filed a
notice of voluntary dismissal. Id. at 203 n.7. The district court considered matters outside the
pleadings when ruling on the defendant's motion for dismissal thereby transforming the defendant's
motion for dismissal into a motion for summary judgment. The motion for summary judgment
terminated the plaintiff's right to voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1)(i). See
supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. In Fisher Bros. Sales Inc. v. United Trading Co., No. 85
Civ. 7502 slip op. (April 28, 1987), another post-Szabo decision, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that it could impose Rule 11 sanctions after a Rule 41(a)(1)(i) voluntary
dismissal. The court distinguished Santiago on the ground that Santiago addressed statutory attor-
ney's fees pursuant to § 1988 of the Civil Rights Act, while Fisher addressed Rule 11 sanctions. The
court stated that it acquired jurisdiction to decide Rule 11 sanctions once counsel signed and filed
the pleading and retained jurisdiction after the dismissal.
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In Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp,36 the Seventh Circuit
ruled that the Second Circuit's holding in Santiago precluded an award
of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1988 after a 41(a)(1)(i)
notice of dismissal, but did not preclude the imposition of Rule 11 sanc-
tions. The Szabo court stated that Rule 11 does not require that a party
prevail on the merits or be entitled to costs in order to receive attorney's
fees. 7 However, this does not distinguish Santiago because the Santiago
court did not rely solely on the section 1988 requiremqnt that a party
prevail in order to receive attorney's fees. The Santiago court broadly
held that a district court "lacked jurisdiction" to award attorney's fees
after a Rule 41(a)(1)(i) dismissal."8 Therefore, to distinguish Santiago,
the Szabo court inquired into the sense in which Santiago used the phrase
"lack of jurisdiction."
The Szabo court addressed three possible meanings for "lack of juris-
diction" as an effect of a 41(a)(1)(i) dismissal.3 9 One situation in which a
court loses jurisdiction occurs where the court has subject matter juris-
diction but loses the power to proceed due to the entry of final judgment
or the filing of a valid appeal.' The Szabo court acknowledged that a
dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i) terminates the case without court
intervention and that ajudge must honor a Rule 41(a)(1)(i) dismissal and
therefore, may not reach the merits of the case.4 ' However, the court
distinguished jurisdiction to decide the case on the merits from jurisdic-
tion to award attorney's fees. The court stated that under the latter
meaning of "jurisdiction," a district court did not lose the power to
36. 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987).
37. Id. at 1077. The court stated that this implied the ability of the district court to award
sanctions whether the plaintiff wins or loses on the merits or dismisses. Id.
38. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. The Szabo court extrapolated from the
broad "lack of jurisdiction" language to find that Santiago held that a district judge could not award
fees under any statute or rule after a Rule 41(a)(1)(i) dismissal. 823 F.2d. at 1077. The court stated,
"To the extent the Second Circuit [Santiago] believes that a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(l)(i) deprives
the court of the power to do anything at all, we agree with the Ninth Circuit's contrary view in
Corcoran." Id. For a discussion of Corcoran, see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
39. The court first addressed federal subject matter jurisdiction. The court stated that although
a court may lack federal subject matter jurisdiction, it has jurisdiction to determine whether the
complaint creates federal subject matter jurisdiction. If the complaint does not create it, attorney's
fees may be awarded as part of the costs. 823 F.2d at 1077-78.
40. Id. at 1078. A judge who enters final judgment loses jurisdiction to hold another trial.
Also, once a losing party has filed a valid appeal from the final decision, the district judge loses
jurisdiction on the merits.
41. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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award attorney's fees.42
The court addressed another possible interpretation of "jurisdiction"
based on Article III's case or controversy requirement.43 A plaintiff's
41(a)(1)(i) dismissal ends the controversy" and therefore ends the court's
power to act. However, the Szabo court posed hypothetical situations to
illustrate that a court does not lose all power with such a loss of contro-
versy.4 5 For example, the court reasoned that a plaintiff could not avoid
sanctions for contempt of court through a Rule 41(a)(1)(i) dismissal.46
The Szabo court concluded that sanctions under Rule 11 are more
analogous to sanctions for contempt of court than to a disposition on the
merits or an award of costs. The court stated that Rule 11 is a "sanc-
tion" for violating a rule of court and therefore a Rule 41(a)(1)(i) dismis-
sal is significant only in that it stops the accumulation of attorney's
fees.4' Rule 11 imposes affirmative requirements upon an attorney's be-
havior which he cannot avoid by dismissing his client's suit.
48
The Szabo court reached the correct conclusion. Rule 11 provides a
sanction for violating a rule of court and, therefore, a court may impose
sanctions on its own motion, whenever a violation is found.49 The rule's
function as a deterrent to frivolous or vexatious claims5" would be under-
42. See Obin v. District #9, 651 F.2d 574, 582 (8th Cir. 1981) (a motion for attorney's fees
raises a collateral and independent claim); Patzer v. Board of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 858-59 (7th
Cir. 1985) (award of attorney's fees is a collateral and separate question to adjudication on the
merits); but see Crocker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 983 (3rd Cir. 1981) (award of attorney's fees is
not collateral to the merits of the litigation and judgment is not final until the district court deter-
mines the extent of attorney's fees).
43. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
44. The court emphasized the language of Bryan v. Smith, 174 F.2d 212, 214 (7th Cir. 1949),
which stated, "It is as if the suit had never been brought." Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1078.
45. Id. In one hypothetical the plaintiff filed suit and paid the filing fee with a bad check. The
plaintiff then dismissed the suit pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i). The court reasoned that in that situa-
tion, "surely the plaintiff could not get out of paying the filing fee because 'it is as if the suit had
never been brought.'" Id. at 1078-79.
46. Id. at 1079. The court hypothesized a hearing for a temporary restraining order where the
plaintiff "emits a Bronx cheer and punches the judge in the nose." The plaintiff then files notice of a
Rule 41(a)(1)(i) dismissal before the sanction for contempt of court. The court stated that surely the
judge can cite the plaintiff for contempt of court without the plaintiff arguing that he cannot be cited
because "it is as if the suit had never been brought." Id.
47. Sanctions imposed after an early 41(a)(1)(i) dismissal are likely to be minimal, although in
this case Canteen requested over $10,000 in attorney's fees. Id.
48. "The obligation to answer for one's act accompanies the act." 823 F.2d at 1079.
49. See also the discussion of Fisher Bros. v. United Trading Co., supra note 35.
50. Rule 11 is not merely compensatory in nature but was formulated to act as a deterrent. See
the Advisory Committee Comments, 97 F.R.D. 196, 199 (calling it a "sanction" to emphasize the
deterrent orientation of the rule). See also supra note 18.
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mined if a plaintiff's attorney could file a complaint without first per-
forming the required inquiry and then avoid sanctions by dismissing the
complaint under Rule 41(a)(1)(i). The Szabo court inferred that, on bal-
ance, the deterrent and compensatory purposes of Rule 11 outweigh the
plaintiff's unfettered right to voluntary dismissal granted in Rule
41(a)(1)(i).
The Szabo decision will have two probable effects on the practice of
law. First, it will strengthen compliance with Rule 11 requirements
before the initial filing of a complaint. A plaintiff's attorney will not file
a claim until he or she has made an inquiry into its legal and factual
validity because he or she cannot escape sanctions by dismissing under
41(a)(1)(i), or by any other means. This holding should have its greatest
impact on complaints requesting temporary restraining orders or prelimi-
nary injunctions where, because of time constraints, a plaintiff's attorney
may not make a thorough inquiry, and because of the same urgency a
defendant's attorney will bill substantial attorney's fees in a short period
of time.51
The second probable effect is a decrease in the incentive to dismiss a
lawsuit voluntarily before the defendant has filed an answer or motion
for summary judgment.52 Not only are plaintiffs no longer assured that
they can unconditionally extricate themselves from a suit through a
41(a)(1)(i) dismissal, they may also fear that a court may consider a no-
tice of voluntary dismissal as an admission that the claim lacks a legal or
factual basis.
The Szabo court held, in effect, that increased compliance with Rule
11 is preferable to a policy allowing the plaintiff an unconditional right to
dismiss. The Szabo court's holding, viewed in the light of Rule I l's dual
role of providing deterrence and compensation, is salutary. Plaintiffs' at-
torneys should be significantly deterred from filing frivolous or vexatious
suits by the threat of Rule 11 sanctions. Defendants will, correspond-
51. The district court could consider the time constraints when determining if the attorney
made a reasonable inquiry prior to filing the suit. See supra note 14.
52. The Santiago court was concerned that a court's ability to reserve jurisdiction to impose
attorney's fees after a voluntary dismissal would discourage plaintiffs from filing voluntary dismis-
sals. See text accompanying supra note 31. However, it seems that halting the running of attorney's
fees is an incentive to voluntarily dismiss. See supra text accompanying note 46.
[Vol. 66:413
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss2/10
1988] RULE 11 AND VOLUNTARY DISMISSALS 421
ingly, be compensated for attorney's fees required to defend meritless
claims.
W.Cs.
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